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1991]

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
BANKRUPTcY LAW

Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. section
541(c)(2) (1990) (section 541(c)(2)), enforces applicable nonbankruptcy law
that restricts the transfer of a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust. Section
1056(d)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. section 1056(d)(1) (1990) (section 1056(d)(1)), prohibits a
participant in an ERISA qualified pension plan from assigning or alienating
the benefits provided under the plan. Until recently, courts have unanimously
held that section 1056(d)(1) is not applicable nonbankruptcy law under
section 501(c)(2) and, thus, does not prohibit the transfer of a debtor's
168
beneficial interest in an ERISA qualified trust to a bankruptcy trustee.
In In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the bankruptcy estates
of several debtors included the debtors' interests in an ERISA qualified
profit sharing and pension plan. The Chapter 7 debtors, employees of
Springs Industries, Inc., participated in Springs Industries' retirement plans.
The retirement plans contained restrictions that prohibited the alienation of
the employees' interests in the plans, and provided for distribution of plan
proceeds to a beneficiary only upon retirement, disability, or termination
of service. The retirement plans' restriction on assignment is necessary to
qualify the plans as ERISA funds and, thus, maintain the retirement plans'
tax exempt status under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. section 501 (1990).
The trustee for the bankruptcy estates of the debtors in Moore sued
the administrator of the Springs Industries' plans seeking a turnover of the
debtors' interests in the retirement plans. The trustee contended that, because
the retirement plans were not spendthrift trusts under South Carolina law,
the plans were not subject to a spendthrift trust's enforceable restriction of
transfer. The bankruptcy court, however, never addressed the status of the
retirement plans under South Carolina law. Instead, the bankruptcy court
held that the retirement plans qualified under ERISA, and the ERISA
restriction on transfers effectively excluded the debtors' interests in the
retirement plans from the debtors' bankruptcy estate. The district court
affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court, and the trustee appealed the
affirmation arguing that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section
541(c)(2) does not include ERISA.
To resolve the issue, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the meaning of the
term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2). First, using a

168. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that § 1056(d)(1) does not
constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2)); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488
(11th Cir. 1985) (same); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); In re Goff, 706
F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). But see In re Lucas, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 470 (6th Cir.
1991) (stating that plain reading of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2) encompasses § 1056(d)(1)); In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring)

(same).
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plain meaning approach, the Fourth Circuit held that the term encompasses
all laws, both state and federal, that provide restrictions on transfers.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit found no indication in the remainder of
section 541(c)(2) suggesting that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
refers exclusively to state law or state spendthrift trust law.
Proceeding from this plain language analysis, the Fourth Circuit referred
to the occurrences of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in the
Bankruptcy Code and to other courts' interpretations of this term. First,
the Fourth Circuit cited two bankruptcy decisions that interpreted "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include pertinent federal law. The Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Colorado in In re Stanley Hotel, 13 Bankr. 926
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1981), held that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy
law," as used in section 1125(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, includes federal
securities law. In In re Ahead By a Length, 100 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law," as used in section 108(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, includes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The Fourth Circuit then cited Morrison-Knudsen v. Director, OWCP,
461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that courts are
to presume that a word has the same meaning in all subsections of the
same statute. On this basis, the Fourth Circuit held that the term "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) encompasses ERISA. The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that the refusal to narrow the term "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" to state law coincided with the Fourth Circuit's decision
in McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985). Although in McLean the Fourth Circuit did
not specifically consider whether ERISA constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the Fourth Circuit held that a court should not confine the
recognition of enforceable transfer restrictions under section 541(c)(2) to
traditional spendthrift trust transfer restrictions.
Having expressed the rationale for their decision, the Fourth Circuit
collectively addressed the cases that interpreted "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" narrowly. In In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that section 1056(d)(1)
does not constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2).
The Goff court based this holding on an extensive review and analysis of
section 541(c)(2)'s legislative history. From this review, the Goff court
concluded that Congress specifically intended "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" to exempt from the bankruptcy estate only spendthrift trusts that
pertinent state law placed beyond the reach of creditors. In In re Graham,
726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit also analyzed section 541(c)(2)'s legislative history and reached
the same conclusion as the Goff court. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in In re
Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), adopted the holdings in Goff
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and Graham and held that section 1056(d)(1) does not constitute "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2).
Initially, the Fourth Circuit stated that these decisions involved revocable
self settled trusts in which the settlor retained the power to amend or
terminate the trust without penalty. In comparison, the ERISA plans at
issue in Moore provided the beneficiaries with no power to control the
plan, make withdrawals from the plan, borrow against the plan, or amend
the plan. The Fourth Circuit noted that the courts which opted for a narrow
interpretation of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" relied on the legislative
history of section 541(c)(2). The Fourth Circuit respectfully declined to
follow this course, expressing the view that an appeal to legislative history
is inappropriate and irrelevant when the statutory language is clear. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's review of the legislative history of section
541(c)(2) revealed only that Congress specifically included state spendthrift
trust law within the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law." The
Fourth Circuit discovered no indication that Congress intended to restrict
the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" exclusively to state spendthrift trust law.
The Fourth Circuit summarized its decision by stating that including
ERISA within the definition of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" gives full
effect to both section 541(c)(2) and section 1056(d)(1). This interpretation
complies with the Supreme Court mandate in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974), that when courts must coordinate the reading of two federal
statutes, the courts must give full effect to both statutes. Section 541(c)(2)
expressly defers to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" that restricts the transfer
of a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust. Section 1056(d)(1) specifically
prohibits the transfer of a beneficiary's interest in an ERISA qualified
pension plan. This transfer restriction gives effect to the overriding purpose
of ERISA to guarantee the security of employees' retirement income.
As additional support, the Fourth Circuit stated that enforcing the
ERISA restriction as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" prevents preferring
the interests of a bankruptcy trustee over the interests of other relevant
parties. Neither plan participants nor general creditors may reach the benefits
provided under an ERISA qualified pension plan, and the Fourth Circuit
could find no reason to permit interested parties to circumvent this restriction
by forcing individuals into involuntary bankruptcy to reach the individuals'
interests in ERISA funds. Including ERISA within the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" provides uniform treatment of ERISA benefit
interests throughout the country rather than subjecting these interests to
variations in state spendthrift trust law. Furthermore, if courts permit
bankruptcy trustees to claim ERISA benefits as part of a debtor's estate,
this transfer may subject the entire ERISA pension plan to disqualification
under section 1056(d)(1) and under section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. section 401(a)(13) (1990), which conditions the tax exempt
status of an ERISA pension fund on the presence of an enforceable transfer
restriction. In McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Pension Fund, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985), the Fourth Circuit recognized
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that section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code requires an antiassignment clause to maintain the tax exempt status of a qualified pension
fund.
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit decision in Moore, the majority of
circuits that have considered the interaction between section 541(c)(2) and
section 1056(d)(1) have held that section 1056(d)(1) does not constitute
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2).16 9 However, a
growing minority of circuit courts that have recently considered the question
are in accord with the Fourth Circuit. 70 Like the Fourth Circuit, these
circuit courts have realized that the plain meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" encompasses all federal and state laws. Therefore, under this
plain meaning, section 541(c)(2) must include section 1056(d)(1) and, thus,
prohibit a bankruptcy trustee from reaching a debtor's interest in a qualified
ERISA pension plan. Only by adopting this approach can courts give full
effect to both statutes and provide uniform treatment to federally sanctioned
ERISA pension plans.

Section 507(a)(7)(E) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. section
507(a)(7)(E) (1990) (section 507(a)(7)(E)) establishes priority status for unsecured, governmental claims for excise taxes. Claims with priority status
in bankruptcy are paid before all general claims against the bankrupt estate.
Courts have employed varying analyses to determine whether a state's
workers' compensation premiums fit within section 507(a)(7)(E)'s priority
status for excise taxes. Several courts have held that workers' compensation
premiums do not constitute excise taxes because the compensation programs

169. See In re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that, based on legislative
history of § 541(c)(2), § 1056(d)(1) does not constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
§ 541(c)(2)); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d
1488 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (same); In re Goff,
706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
170. See In re Lucas, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 470 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that plain
reading of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2) encompasses § 1056(d)(1)); In
re Kincaid, 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (same). Judge Fletcher
concurred in the result because the court held that applicable state spendthrift trust law
exempted the debtor's interest from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1169. However,
Judge Fletcher expressed grave doubts about the majority's reliance on In re Daniel, 771 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1985), to dispose of the question whether "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
under § 541(c)(2) encompasses § 1056(d)(1). Id. Judge Fletcher acknowledged the same concerns
that the Fourth Circuit expressed in In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990), and stated
that a plain reading of § 541(c)(2) encompasses § 1056(d)(1). Id. An analysis of the legislative
history of § 541(c)(2) is unnecessary because the language of § 541(c)(2) is not ambiguous,
and the legislative history of § 541(c)(2) is inconclusive on the point. Id. Furthermore, the
holding of the majority poses a serious threat to all participants in a qualified pension plan
by possibly disqualifying the plan from both ERISA status and tax exempt status. Id. This
clearly frustrates the purpose of Congress in establishing ERISA protection for qualified
pension plans and provides no harmony between federal bankruptcy law and ERISA law. Id.
at 1170.
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more closely resemble insurance than taxes. 17 In other cases, however,
courts merely have inquired whether the compensation premiums could be
deemed taxes, without considering the insurance attributes of the compensation statutes.172 In New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. West Virginia Workers'
Compensation Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth Circuit
considered whether premiums levied under the West Virginia Workers'
Compensation statute (Compensation statute) were excise taxes for the
purpose of priority status in bankruptcy.
In New Neighborhoods the plaintiff, a debtor employer, argued that
the premiums were not excise taxes under section 507(a)(7)(E). The plaintiff
alleged that the Compensation statute established a state system of insurance,
the dues to which constituted insurance premiums, not excise taxes. The
Compensation statute contains several insurance characteristics. The fact
that the Compensation statute refers to the premiums. The statutory premiums, like insurance premiums, fluctuate to reflect each employer's risk of
loss. Furthermore, employers may opt out of paying the premiums with the
Commissioner's permission. Finally, the purpose of the Compensation fund
was to disburse the costs of injured employees among employers in West
Virginia, which reflects an insurance pool. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged
that if the Compensation premiums were taxes, the Compensation statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The plaintiff reasoned that this constitutional
violation existed because the Compensation statute imposed varying tax rates
to reflect factors such as safety records. Consequently, the Compensation
statute, according to the plaintiff, established unequal taxation. The plaintiff
also asserted that the unequal assessments violated Article X, section 1 of
the West Virginia Constitution providing for uniform taxation. The defendant, the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund, contended that the
premiums were excise taxes and, therefore, entitled to priority status in
bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court held that the Compensation statute's premiums
were not excise taxes under section 507(a)(7)(E). On appeal, the United

171. See In re Smith Jones, Inc., 36 Bankr. 408, 410-11 (D. Minn. 1984) (holding that
Ohio's workers' compensation premiums were not taxes because of insurance characteristics

of statute); In re Payne, 27 Bankr. 809, 817 (D. Kan. 1983) (holding that Kansas' workers'
compensation premiums were not taxes because of predominance of non-tax characteristics).
172. See In re Metro Transp. Co., 117 Bankr. 143, 152-54 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that

Pennsylvania's compensation premiums were not taxes under Feirling standard because employers had option whether to join compensation fund); In re Primeline Indus., 103 Bankr.
861 (D. Ohio 1989) (holding that Ohio's workers' compensation premiums are taxes because
premiums are exacted for public purpose); In re E.A. Nord Co., 75 Bankr. 634, 636 (D.
Wash. 1987) (holding that Washington's workers' compensation premiums were taxes because
premiums were exacted for public purpose); In re Tri-Manufacturing and Sales Co., 82 Bankr.
58, 60 (D. Ohio 1983) (holding that Ohio's workers' compensation premiums are taxes because
premiums are exacted for public purpose); In re Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539, 540-41 (D. Ore. 1980)
(holding that Oregon's workers' compensation premiums were taxes because premiums were

exacted for public purpose).
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States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reversed
the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that premiums due under the
Compensation statute were excise taxes. Accordingly, the district court held
that the Compensation statute's premiums were entitled to priority status
under section 507(a)(7)(E). New Neighborhoods, Inc. appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit first examined an employer's obligations, and the
West Virginia State Compensation Commissioner's (Commissioner's) rights,
under the Compensation statute. The Compensation statute requires all West
Virginia employers either to subscribe to the Compensation fund or, upon
demonstration of financial fitness, to opt-out of the fund and become selfinsured. Subscribers to the fund must make premium payments.. Even a
self-insuring employer, however, must post a bond with the fund, attest to
the total earnings of its employees, and pay to the fund administrative
expenses, costs of a relief fund and payments to cover delinquent employers'
non-payments. The Compensation statute empowers the Commissioner to
commence a civil action against an employer who fails to make a required
payment. The Compensation statute exempts employers who comply with
the statute from liability for employee tort suits.
To resolve the issue whether the Compensation statute's premiums
constituted taxes, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Supreme Court's definition
of taxes in bankruptcy as expressed in City of New York v. Feirling, 313
U.S. 282 (1941). In Feirling the Supreme Court defined excise taxes under
the Bankruptcy Act as pecuniary burdens for the purpose of defraying
authorized governmental undertakings. The Fourth Circuit noted that an
excise tax is an indirect tax conditioned on certain acts, occupational
performances, or the enjoyment of privileges. In applying the Feirling
definition, the Fourth Circuit cited three characteristics of the Compensation
statute's premiums that were similar to excise taxes. First, the liability for
the premiums arose indirectly through the act or transaction of employing.
Second, the state compelled payment of the premiums. The Fourth Circuit
placed little importance on the fact that employers could opt out of the
Compensation fund, apparently because employers can opt out only with
the Commissioner's approval. Third, the Compensation statute benefitted
the public generally because the system did not burden the public with the
costs of injured employees.
The New Neighborhoods court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the Compensation statute resembled an insurance program. The court acknowledged that the Compensation statute contained various insurance
characteristics. The court, however, found that these insurance attributes of
the Compensation statute were not determinative. The court regarded as
controlling the fact that the state compelled the premiums for a public
purpose. The Fourth Circuit found that the primary distinction between
taxes and insurance was that between the power of the state and the rights
of citizenry. Furthermore, the court concluded that whether the state legislature enacted the Compensation statute under the police power or revenue
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raising power, the fact that the state compelled the premiums satisfied the
Feirling standard. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that denoting
the premiums as excise taxes was permissible.
The Fourth Circuit also recognized, however, the need to limit priority
claims in bankruptcy. Priority claims, according to the New Neighborhoods
court, decrease the funds available to the general creditors, the "little
fellows" in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Fourth Circuit, however, found
that limiting the Workers' Compensation Fund's priority claim was unnecessary, because the priority claim would benefit injured employees, also the
little fellows, in the bankruptcy proceeding. The court concluded that
priority status for the premiums would benefit injured employees by helping
to ensure the financial soundness of the Fund. Therefore, the court held
that the compensation premiums should be classified as excise taxes.
In considering the plaintiff's claim that the differing premium rates
violated the equal protection clause, the Fourth Circuit noted the state's
need for flexibility in tailoring taxes to local needs and usages. The Fourth
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Allied Stores of Ohio v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959), that the equal protection clause requires
that taxes have a rational, non-arbitrary basis. Under the Compensation
statute, the premiums vary according to the nature of the employer's
business, the degree of employee hazard, and the employer's safety record.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Compensation statute's graduated
dues to reflect the risk of employee injury had a sufficiently rational basis
to pass the Bowers test.
Finally, the New Neighborhoods court addressed the plaintiff's contention that the unequal premium rates violated the West Virginia constitutional
uniform taxation requirement. While the Fourth Circuit expressed doubt
regarding the merit of the plaintiff's allegation, the court refused to rule
on the issue, instead leaving the issue for the West Virginia courts and
legislature to decide. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the Compensation statute's premiums were entitled to
priority status in bankruptcy.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion comports with many cases in which courts
applied the broad Feirling definition of excise tax to hold that workers'
compensation premiums were excise taxes in bankruptcy.' 73 The New Neighborhoods court, however, tempered the broad Feirling standard by lending
credence to the policy of limiting priority claims in bankruptcy. While the
facts of New Neighborhoods warranted application of Feirling, the Fourth

173. See In re Primeline Indus., 103 Bankr. 861 (D. Ohio 1989) (holding that Ohio's

workers' compensation premiums are taxes because premiums are exacted for public purpose);
In re E.A. Nord Co., 75 Bankr. 634, 636 (D. Wash. 1987) (holding that Washington's workers'
compensation premiums were taxes because premiums were exacted for public purpose); In re
Tn-Manufacturing and Sales Co., 82 Bankr. 58, 60 (D. Ohio 1983) (holding that Ohio's

workers' compensation premiums are taxes because premiums are exacted for public purpose);
In re Beaman, 9 Bankr. 539, 540-41 (D. Ore. 1980) (holding that Oregon's workers' compensation premiums were taxes because premiums were exacted for public purpose).
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Circuit expressed some reservation
for applying Feirling to all government
174

exactions for public purposes.

The New Neighborhoods court declined to engage in a comparison
between the tax and insurance attributes of the West Virginia Workers'
Compensation statute. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's New Neighborhoods decision is at odds with those cases in which courts inquired whether
the compensation statutes contained more insurance attributes than tax
attributes.175 In this latter group of cases, the courts followed a standard
that distinguishes between statutes aimed at raising revenue and statutes
aimed at regulating an activity. 76 Under this comparison rationale, assessments that are not primarily geared toward raising revenue are not taxes.
Although the Fourth Circuit has applied that standard in other contexts, in
New Neighborhoods the Fourth Circuit held that the Feirling definition of
excise tax applies in bankruptcy, and refused to give serious consideration
to the regulatory aspects of West Virginia's Workers' Compensation statute.
Section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. section
1112(b) (1990) (section 1112(b)), sets out a number of circumstances under
which a court may dismiss a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.'7 The language

174. See In re Lorber Indus. of Cal., 675 F.2d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 1982) (supporting
policy of less expansive interpretation of taxes in bankruptcy); In re Great N.W. Lumber &
Millwork Corp., 64 Bankr. 426, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); In re Payne, 27 Bankr. 809, 817
(D. Kan. 1983) (same).
175. See In re Smith Jones, Inc., 36 B.R. 408, 410-11 (D. Minn. 1984) (holding that
Ohio's workers' compensation premiums were not taxes because of insurance characteristics
of statute); In re Payne, 27 B.R. 809, 817 (D. Kan. 1983) (holding that Kansas' workers'
compensation premiums were not taxes because of predominance of non-tax characteristics).
176. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884) (distinguishing between taxes used
for general support of government and assessments for fund aimed at regulating commerce);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Or., 899 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1990)
(distinguishing taxes for purpose of raising revenue and assessments for regulating activities);
Brock v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 796 F.2d 481, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(holding that District of Columbia's workers' compensation premiums were not taxes because
purpose of assessments was to regulate liability rather than raise revenue); State of S.C. v.
Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that if regulation is primary purpose of
statute revenue raised under statute is considered fee rather than tax).
177. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1988) (listing criteria under which bankruptcy court may
dismiss Chapter 11 petition). The relevant part of § 1112(b) states that:
[T]he [bankruptcy] court may ... dismiss a case under [Chapter 11] ... for
cause, including(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable
likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any fixed
time by the court;
(5) denial of confirmation of every proposed plan and denial of a request
made of additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a
plan;
(6) revocation of an order of confirmation under section 1144 of this title,
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of section 1112(b) does not include a good faith requirement for filing a
Chapter 11 petition. However, most courts have concluded that, when
interpreted in light of established bankruptcy policy considerations, section
1112(b) implicitly includes a good faith filing requirement. 7, The problem
these courts have faced, however, is the development of a standard to use
to determine whether a debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition in good faith.
To find bad faith, some courts demand both evidence of the objective
futility of any successful reorganization effort and evidence of the debtor's
subjective bad faith in filing the petition. 179 Other courts have determined
that a finding of either objective futility or subjective bad faith is sufficient
to warrant dismissal of the bankruptcy petition. 8 0
In Carolin Corporation v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue
of whether a bankruptcy court may dismiss a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition that is not filed in good faith. In Carolin the plaintiff,
Carolin Corporation (Carolin), filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition fifty
minutes before a scheduled foreclosure sale of Carolin's five-and-a-half acre
parcel and industrial building in Lexington, North Carolina. The filing
automatically stayed the foreclosure proceeding. The defendant, Robert J.
Miller, Jr. (Miller), was Carolin's only secured creditor. Miller was the
successor beneficiary of a purchase money deed of trust on the Lexington
property and successor payee under the purchase promissory note that
Carolin executed to finance its original purchase of the land and building.
Miller alleged that Carolin's bankruptcy petition was not filed in good faith
because Carolin's purpose in filing was to frustrate and delay Miller, not
to rehabilitate a distressed business.
The dispute over the valuable Lexington property involved a series of
incidents and actors and began nearly four years before Carolin's December

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

and denial of confirmation of another plan or a modified plan under
section 1129 of this title;
inability to effectuate substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
termination of a plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified
in the plan; or
nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.

Id.
178. See In re Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that good faith filing requirement is present within the provisions and policies of the Bankruptcy
Code); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1137 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
179. See In re Little Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that court must examine debtor's financial condition and motives before dismissing bankruptcy
petition for lack of good faith in filing); In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th

Cir. 1984) (same).
180. See In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd., 849 F.2d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that either futility in reorganizing or bad faith in filing is sufficient to dismiss Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition); In re North Redington Beach Assoc., 91 Bankr. 166, 169 (Bankr. M.D.

Fla. 1988) (same); In re Oakgrove Village, Ltd., 90 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(same); In re Markunes, 78 Bankr. 875, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (same); In re McDermott,
78 Bankr. 646, 651 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
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1986 Chapter 11 filing. In March 1983, Steve and Linda Pitchersky purchased the Lexington property from the Miller Tool Company, a business
then managed by Miller's mother, Nancy P. Miller (Mrs. Miller). In late
1984, the Pitcherskys defaulted on the promissory note used to purchase
the property, and Miller Tool repurchased the property at a foreclosure
sale. In January 1985, Carolin purchased the Lexington property from
Miller Tool, financing the transaction with a promissory note and deed of
trust. Carolin soon leased the property to JMC Furniture Company (JMC),
but fires in June 1985 and April 1986 caused extensive damage to the
building on the property. A dispute between Carolin and Mrs. Miller over
the proceeds from the fire insurance resulted in a failure to completely fix
the roof of the building. In the summer of 1986, JMC defaulted on its
lease of the Lexington property. Because Carolin was unable to find a new
tenant and had no other source of income, it soon defaulted on its
promissory note to Mrs. Miller.
The day before Mrs. Miller foreclosed on the property, the Pitcherskys
re-entered the picture, incorporated the Benz Holding Company (Benz), and
purchased all of Carolin's stock. Benz then forced Carolin to file a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition less than one hour before the foreclosure. The next
day in bankruptcy court, Mrs. Miller filed a motion for relief from the
automatic stay, adequate protection, conversion of the case to Chapter 7,
or dismissal of the Chapter 11 petition. The bankruptcy court dismissed
Carolin's Chapter 11 petition for lack of good faith in filing. The court
concluded that Carolin's case was a prime example of what the court termed
"the new debtor syndrome," in which a one-asset entity is created shortly
before foreclosure to isolate investors from the insolvent property and its
creditors. The bankruptcy court also found other indicia of bad faith,
including the fact that, other than Mrs. Miller's claim, no other substantial
secured or unsecured claims on Carolir 's assets existed. Additionally, the
court noted that Carolin's chances of finding a new tenant or another
source of income were slim, that Carolin had only one employee, and that
the Benz principals, the Pitcherskys, had a prior history of default on the
same property with the same creditor. The bankruptcy court concluded that
the Pitcherskys had created Benz to force Carolin to file its Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition for the sole purpose of acquiring the valuable Lexington
property at the existing financing terms without having to pay the fair
market price at the foreclosure sale. The court held that Carolin attempted
to subvert the purposes of the bankruptcy process by using the system to
maximize an investment opportunity without any intention of attempting to
reorganize the business.
Carolin appealed to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina and moved the bankruptcy court to stay the
dismissal and to reinstate the Chapter 11 case pending the outcome of the
appeal. The bankruptcy court granted the motion on condition that Carolin
provide adequate protection to Mrs. Miller's interests while awaiting the
district court's resolution of the appeal. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's findings and rejected claims that Carolin's compliance
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with the stay order of the bankruptcy court proved that Carolin had the
requisite intent to successfully reorganize while at the same time protecting
Mrs. Miller's interests. Carolin appealed the district court's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Pending appeal, Mrs. Miller died and Robert J. Miller became the
proper party-in-interest. Carolin ceased giving adequate protection to Miller's interests in violation of the bankruptcy court's stay order, claiming that
Mrs. Miller's death permitted Carolin to withhold protection because the
stay order required payments to Mrs. Miller only. The bankruptcy court
granted Miller's motion requesting his substitution as the proper party-ininterest and ordered Carolin to cure all payments in arrears by September
15, 1988. The bankruptcy court dissolved the original stay order two weeks
later after finding that Carolin had not complied with that order, thus
clearing the way for a foreclosure sale on the Lexington property. Carolin
then filed a motion with the Fourth Circuit seeking a stay of foreclosure
proceedings pending a final decision on the appeal from the district court.
The Fourth Circuit denied Carolin's motion.
In analyzing the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Code requires that a
debtor file a Chapter 11 petition in good faith, the Fourth Circuit in Carolin
first examined specific provisions and policy considerations of the Code.
The court concluded that a good faith requirement for Chapter 11 petitions
is implicit in the Code, because such a requirement prevents abuse of the
bankruptcy process by compelling the debtor to demonstrate that a realistic
possibility of a successful reorganization exists. The Fourth Circuit also
noted that its holding was consistent with the Fifth Circuit in In re Little
Creek Development Co., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986), and the Sixth
Circuit in In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
However, the Fourth Circuit did not rely upon broad policy considerations alone in deciding Carolin. The court examined several specific provisions of the Code and found that a good faith filing requirement was
needed to give meaning to the Code provisions. The court found that section
1112(b) provides three reasons for requiring good faith filings. First, the
court stated that section 1112(b) sets out a non-exhaustive list of objective
criteria justifying dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition on grounds of the
futility of effective reorganization. Second, the court noted that the criteria
were consistent with a subjective lack of good faith on the debtor's part in
filing a bankruptcy petition. Finally, section 1112(b) permits dismissal for
cause, which suggested to the court that lack of good faith might be
included as a proper dismissal for cause. The Carolin court also noted that
section 362(d)(1), which permits a court to lift the automatic stay for cause,
in addition to Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a), which discourages frivolous claims,
provided additional support for its holding.
After concluding that the Bankruptcy Code demanded good faith filing
of Chapter 11 petitions, the Carolin court addressed the issue of the
standards that a bankruptcy court should use to determine whether a filing
is in good faith. The court noted that bankruptcy courts should not casually
dismiss a Chapter 11 petition, because denying the debtor access to the
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Chapter 11 proceeding is a drastic measure, and creditors can protect
themselves through other means. The Fourth Circuit concluded that requiring bankruptcy courts to find evidence of both objective futility of reorganization and subjective bad faith in filing the petition would ensure
adequate protection for the diverse and conflicting interests of both the
debtor and creditors. The court then concluded that a bankruptcy court
must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether bad
faith is evident under the objective and subjective prongs of the Chapter
11 dismissal inquiry.
After adopting the two-part test for conducting the good faith inquiry,
the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of Carolin's Chapter
I1 petition. The Carolin court found sufficient evidence to support the
district court's conclusion that Carolin did not possess a realistic possibility
of successfully rehabilitating itself under the objective prong of the good
faith inquiry. First, the Fourth Circuit noted the futility of Carolin's
prospects of finding any new tenant that would want to rent a fire-damaged
building. The court also found that the Benz principals were unwilling to
invest any substantial funds into Carolin for operating or capital needs
during the Chapter 11 reorganization. Finally, the court concluded that
Carolin was analogous to a shell corporation, because it lacked significant
assets other than the Lexington property, and also lacked any indicia of
viable business relationships, such as unsecured creditors with substantial
claims.
Turning to the subjective prong of the good faith inquiry, the Fourth
Circuit found that the record contained direct and circumstantial evidence
suggesting that Carolin filed its Chapter 11 petition with subjective bad
faith. First, the court noted that the Pitcherskys formed Benz the day before
foreclosure on the Lexington property and caused Carolin to file its bankruptcy petition fifty minutes before the foreclosure sale. Although the
Bankruptcy Code encourages emergency efforts to forestall imminent financial collapse, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Code permits
debtors to engage in such efforts only if debtors are willing to provide for
the adequate protection of creditors and willing to accept the risk that
reorganization might eventually fail. The court stated that the actions of
the Benz principals demonstrated that Carolin's purposes were not of an
acceptable nature. First, the court recognized that Carolin continuously
refused to give adequate protection to Miller's interests throughout the
course of the legal proceedings. Second, the court focused on Carolin's
failure to make reasonable efforts to find a new tenant for the property.
The Fourth Circuit noted that Carolin did not attempt to repair the firedamaged building to make it more attractive to prospective tenants. Finally,
the court concluded that the district court's assessment of the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the petition comported with the phenomenon
known as the "new debtor syndrome." The "new debtor syndrome," the
Fourth Circuit explained, is characterized by the creation of a single-asset
entity on the eve of foreclosure for the sole purpose of isolating investors
from the insolvent property and its creditors. The Carolin court concluded

